The author argues that the measures are inaccurate and detrimental to the success of deterrence.It notes that residual military capability is an inadequate measure of strategic assessment.Long before he was Secretary of Defense, or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates was briefly the director of the Strategic Evaluation Center, Office of Strategic Research at the CIA (he held that position from 1979-1981).
An interview with the Former Deputy Director of the CIA, also Former Director of the NSA.
Studeman urges for greater inter-agency cooperation and communication in the interview.
We have grouped the documents in rough thematic fashion and, within each theme, by publication date where possible.
(Many of the declassified items do not reflect a date or have dates and other information redacted.) Our five broad subject areas are: Intelligence Agency Leadership and Governance; Operations and Counterintelligence; Law and Oversight; Analysis; and Science and Technology.
For ease of reference, each entry within each subject is accompanied by a brief summary of the document’s contents.
Note: the below reflects only a portion of the September trove; more summaries from it will be added on a rolling basis. Brennan discusses the aims and goals of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, explaining that he thinks that terrorism analysis is “a distinct discipline in the intelligence arena”, but that TTIC also has to work closely with intelligence officers across its partner agencies.
Hall also outlines his three goals that he had in mind when he started in his role as NRO Director: getting the “financial house in order”, improving the NRO’s “bedside manner”, and preparing the NRO for a “post-Cold War world.”A transcript of speeches given by Tenet, then-Director of Central Intelligence, and Calder, then-Deputy Director for Administration, at a 2000 event honoring the CIA's Office of Communications.
In their speeches, Tenet and Calder pay tribute to the Office of Communication’s achievements since its creation in 1947.
Among many other things, Morell recounts his conversation with President Bush, when the latter initially inquired who might be responsible for the attacks.
This article lays out the rivalry between General Mac Arthur and the OSS during the South Pacific campaign.